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Departmentalism—the ability and right of each branch of the 
federal government to interpret the Constitution for itself—has a 
long and often honorable history.1  But within the past seven decades 
the Supreme Court has come to dominate constitutional interpreta-
tion, and more recently has made clear that it intends to keep the 
Constitution as its own preserve.  If a successful case or controversy 
can be framed, then when faced with claims for independent consti-
tutional interpretation from other branches, the Court may assert 
that it defers when it agrees with that branch’s interpretation, but the 
deference disappears when it disagrees. 
I 
Three months after his landslide 1936 reelection victory, Presi-
dent Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed expanding the number of Su-
preme Court justices from nine to fifteen.  The Court-packing plan 
was a direct response to a conservative majority on the Court that had 
invalidated ten major New Deal statutes, including its industrial and 
agricultural centerpieces, in the previous two years and seemed 
poised to finish off the rest of the New Deal in the next year or so. 
A cartoon shows FDR rehearsing his six new smiling justices.  He 
instructs:  “Great!  Now, once more, all together.”  The six exclaim 
“Yes!” in unison.  The Constitution and the Scales of Justice are par-
tially visible in a trash barrel.2  The cartoon was spot on.  Not only 
Republicans, but also a number of Progressives believed that Roose-
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 1 Andrew Jackson’s veto of the rechartering of the Bank of the United States is typically 
cited as the quintessential example of departmentalism.  But my favorite is an exchange 
between James Monroe and the Court over his veto of money for the Cumberland Road.  
Monroe sent a pamphlet to the justices articulating his views.  They responded through 
William Johnson by telling him that because of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316 (1819), they would sustain funding for internal improvements.  Monroe was un-
moved. 
 2 Pictured in MARY ANN HARRELL & BURNETT ANDERSON, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:  THE 
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 93 (6th ed. 1994). 
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velt, who had already dominated Congress, was intent on removing 
the last check on his rule.  FDR did not see it that way (or so he as-
serted).  What he opposed was not the Court or the Constitution, but 
rather the Court’s highly restrictive interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.  As he told an aide right after the second inaugural, “[w]hen the 
Chief Justice read me the oath and came to the words ‘support the 
Constitution of the United States’ I felt like saying:  ‘Yes, but it’s the 
Constitution as I understand it, flexible enough to meet any new 
problem of democracy—not the kind of Constitution your Court has 
raised up as a barrier to progress and democracy.’”3 
The Court-packing plan was decisively defeated.  Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes, who had been instrumental in its defeat, kept 
his nine-member Court, but the attack on the Court plus multiple 
appointments gave FDR the Constitution he wanted.  No further New 
Deal statutes were invalidated. 
Attorney General Robert Jackson wrote that “[w]hat we de-
manded for our generation was the right consciously to influence the 
evolutionary process of constitutional law, as other generations had 
done.”4  Justice Robert Jackson’s Wickard v. Filburn5 opinion helped 
turn evolution into revolution. 
The summer after Wickard, FDR gave a Fireside Chat on inflation, 
the need for wage and price controls, and the necessity of rationing.  
He asked Congress for appropriate legislation, but “[i]n the event 
that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall accept 
the responsibility, and I will act. . . . The President has the powers, 
under the Constitution and under Congressional Acts, to take meas-
ures necessary to avert a disaster which would interfere with the win-
ning of the war.”6  After noting that war-time responsibilities were 
“very grave,” he stated that he could not tell what powers would be 
needed to win the war.7  He then added: 
The American people can be sure that I will use my powers with a full 
sense of my responsibility to the Constitution and to my country.  The 
American people can also be sure that I shall not hesitate to use every 
power vested in me to accomplish the defeat of our enemies . . . . When 
 
 3 SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 144 (1st ed. 1952) (emphasis in origi-
nal). 
 4 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY:  A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN 
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS xiv (1st ed. 1941). 
 5 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (interpreting the Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate 
home grown wheat consumed on the farm). 
 6 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1942, at 364 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950). 
 7 Id. 
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the war is won, the powers under which I act automatically revert to the 
people—to whom they belong.8 
FDR had already exercised ample war powers.  He had authorized 
the internment of all persons of Japanese descent on the West Coast.  
Closer to the Fireside Chat was the military trial of eight Nazis who 
were quickly captured after being put ashore by submarines to sabo-
tage industrial facilities.  Roosevelt ordered them tried in secret by an 
appointed military court without recourse to courts.  Both of these 
actions resulted in Supreme Court opinions rubber-stamping the 
President’s acts. 
The saboteurs’ military defense counsel argued that Ex parte Milli-
gan,9 where after the Civil War, the Court held courts martial could 
not try civilians while civil courts were open, afforded the defendants 
the right to be tried before civil courts.  After three weeks of the mili-
tary trial, but before the inevitable verdict, the Court rushed into a 
special summer session to hear the case.  Attorney General Francis 
Biddle had privately told several members of the Court that Roosevelt 
would order executions regardless of what the Court held.  Even 
though all justices had qualms about the procedure, they unani-
mously upheld the administration’s act.10 
The Court rendered its judgment two days after hearing the case; 
three days later the military commission found the defendants guilty, 
and within a week, six of the eight were executed.  Speed on the ha-
beas appeal was demanded by the President and a howling national 
press (although the Court could not write its opinion anywhere near 
as rapidly, hence it came down some months later).  The saboteurs 
got what they should have expected if captured, but the procedure 
did not look pretty despite contemporary flag waving by the press, 
nicely illustrated by a self-congratulatory editorial in The New Republic:  
“[E]ven in wartime and even toward the enemy, we do not abandon 
our basic protection of individual rights.”11 
The relocation and confinement of 112,000 people of Japanese 
descent, most of whom were American citizens, was the biggest single 
blight on civil liberties in America in the twentieth century.  Spurred 
by public fears after the attack on Pearl Harbor, long-standing preju-
dice against Asians, as well as national newspaper columnists, Roose-
velt and then Congress authorized the War Department to declare 
 
 8 Id. at 365. 
 9 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). 
 10 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that the military tribunal had jurisdiction over 
unlawful combatants against the United States). 
 11 The Saboteurs and the Court, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 10, 1942, at 159. 
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certain areas as military zones and thereafter the commander of the 
area could impose curfews, travel restrictions, and order people ex-
cluded entirely from the area. 
General John DeWitt, who commanded the West Coast, first im-
posed a curfew on all people of Japanese descent.  In an Orwellian 
twist, the order referred to Japanese American citizens as “non-
alien[s].”12  DeWitt followed with an order prohibiting those covered 
from leaving the West Coast.  Three weeks later he excluded them 
from the West Coast.  Forbidden to leave, forbidden to stay, the only 
legal option was to leave jobs, homes, and possessions behind (or un-
load them at distress prices) and to report for internment, mainly in 
the arid west, in one of ten god-forsaken, dust-blown, barbed-wire 
fenced camps. 
The curfew made sense pending determinations of the situation 
of who was loyal and who was not, but DeWitt had no intention of 
making those determinations, and Biddle’s legal objections and FBI 
Director J. Edgar Hoover’s conclusion that there was no evidence that 
any Japanese Americans were engaged in sabotage were brushed 
aside by FDR.  The exclusion order meant that all Japanese Ameri-
cans would be interred because, as DeWitt so delicately pronounced:  
“[A] Jap is a Jap.”13 
A month before the 1944 presidential election, the Court heard 
oral arguments on the detention involving Fred Korematsu’s crime of 
violating the exclusion order, described by Jackson as “being present 
in the state whereof he is a citizen, near the place where he was born, 
and where all his life he has lived.”14  Six justices joined Black’s opin-
ion that despite some rousing language—racial classifications “are 
immediately suspect” and must be subject “to the most rigid scru-
tiny”15—justified the detention on the ground that war is hell. 
There were dissents.  Owen Roberts found that the Catch-22 of 
the orders violated due process.  Murphy accurately characterized the 
program as having descended “into the ugly abyss of racism.”16  The 
most interesting was Jackson’s conclusion that courts should abstain 
from reviewing the constitutionality of military orders because the 
outcome was fore-ordained:  the pressures of war would cause the 
courts to validate the orders by “distort[ing] the Constitution to ap-
 
 12 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, 7 FED. REG. 3967 (May 3, 1942); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 234 (1944). 
 13 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 46 (1983) (quoting DeWitt). 
 14 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 15 Id. at 216. 
 16 Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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prove all that the military may deem expedient.”17  That had ex-
plained the World War I cases as well as those already decided during 
the current war.  Jackson recognized that the military was carrying 
out a military program, not worrying about the niceties of the Consti-
tution, but “[a] military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to 
last longer than the military emergency.”18  When a court validates the 
order it offers “a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority 
that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.  Every 
repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking 
and expands it to new purposes.”19 
FDR did not live to return his wartime powers to the people.  Be-
cause World War II merged almost seamlessly into the Cold War, the 
Court would spend decades trying to reclaim them.  As Jackson 
noted, precedents matter. 
II 
During the Korean War, President Harry Truman tested that pres-
idential authority when he ordered the steel mills seized to avert a 
strike that he claimed would adversely affect defense production.  
Truman claimed that the president’s executive authority justified his 
actions and noted that presidents from Lincoln to FDR had similarly 
exercised such a power.  At trial, the U.S. Attorney asserted that while 
Congressional powers were limited by the Constitution, presidential 
powers were not.  Thus there was no judicial role (except to validate 
Truman’s position).  If there were objections, then elections or im-
peachment were the only remedies.  It was not a winning argument 
and even when abandoned at the Court, Truman lost. 
Hugo Black’s majority opinion made short work of Truman’s 
claims.  “The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking proc-
ess to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of 
laws he thinks bad.  And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivo-
cal about who shall make laws which the President is to execute.”20  A 
sophisticated concurring opinion by Jackson noted that the presi-
dent’s powers were at their lowest ebb when there was a conflicting 
legislative policy (as here) and at their highest when acting pursuant 
 
 17 Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. at 246. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
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to an express or implied Congressional policy.21  He counseled 
against leveraging the president’s largely unchecked foreign affairs 
powers into the domestic sphere “by his own commitment of the Na-
tion’s armed forces to some foreign venture.”22 
Truman took the defeat badly in no small part because Chief Jus-
tice Fred Vinson, one of his four appointees to the Court, had advised 
him that a majority of the Court would back him and because two 
former attorneys general, FDR’s Jackson and Truman’s Tom Clark, 
had justified seizures while in the executive office.  Indeed, Jackson 
had gone farther and in 1940 approved the excellent, but probably 
illegal, destroyers for bases deal with Great Britain.  Yet both voted 
against Truman in the Steel Seizure case.  One of Jackson’s law clerks, 
William Rehnquist, attributed the loss to the related unpopularity of 
both Truman and the Korean War.23  Bringing the presidency back 
into the Constitution also played a role. 
III 
Five years later, the Court found itself on the receiving end of a 
struggle over constitutional interpretation of the right of self-
preservation against communists.  After Senator Joseph McCarthy 
had been condemned by the Senate in December, 1954, the Court 
interpreted the action as signaling a waning of domestic anti-
communism.  Thus, in 1955, the Court cut back on summary dismiss-
als from civil service on loyalty grounds by limiting them to employ-
ees who had access to sensitive information.24  More significant were 
two state cases, Pennsylvania v. Nelson25 and Slochower v. Board of Higher 
Education of New York City,26 both decided a year later.  Nelson reversed 
the sedition conviction of Steve Nelson, the leader of the Communist 
Party in Western Pennsylvania, on the ground that the state law was 
preempted by the various federal statutes dealing with communists.  
In Slochower the Court invalidated New York’s policy of treating the 
invocation of the right against self-incrimination when questioned 
 
 21 Jackson’s much-celebrated twilight zone (where there is no announced Congressional 
policy) is probably a null set.  There are so many statutes that the Court can (probably) 
always find at least one to (mis)construe to situate the case as either following or overrul-
ing a Congressional policy. 
 22 Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 642 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 23 WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 190–91 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 2d ed. 2001) 
(1987). 
 24 Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956). 
 25 350 U.S. 497 (1956). 
 26 350 U.S. 551 (1956). 
Feb. 2010] COURT’S CONSTITUTION 535 
 
about employment duties as a resignation.  Seemingly ending the pe-
nalization of Fifth Amendment Communists, the Court ruled that be-
cause there were innocent reasons for pleading the Fifth, a state 
could not so penalize its use.  These decisions provoked outcries from 
Southerners and national security conservatives, but were greeted 
with satisfaction by civil libertarians as signaling the end of judicial 
acquiescence to McCarthyism.  The signal was unmistakable in the 
1956 Term when the Court decided twelve cases dealing with com-
munists or communism, and the government parties lost each time. 
The Eighty-Fifth Congress, then in session, proved that just be-
cause McCarthy was dead (having drunk himself into the grave in ear-
ly 1957), it didn’t mean that anti-communism was also dead.  The 
1957 decisions caused the state attorneys general as well as the Amer-
ican Bar Association to join Congressional national security conserva-
tives in sharp criticism of the Court.  A number of bills were quickly 
introduced to curb the Court, but in the summer of 1957 little could 
be done because Congress was focused almost entirely on what would 
become the Civil Rights Act of 1957.27  Thus, while Congress was not 
in a position to do much more than verbally trounce the Court, it 
nevertheless hurriedly passed the Jencks Act (on defendants’ access 
to FBI interview notes of witnesses testifying against them) at the de-
mand of FBI director J. Edgar Hoover.  Although the Act basically 
codified one of the 1957 decisions,28 it was opposed by the Court’s de-
fenders and seen by all as a slap at the Court. 
The second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress had time to con-
sider Court-curbing bills even as the Court allowed states again to dis-
charge Fifth Amendment Communists—this time on the grounds of 
incompetence.29  The House passed measures, which created a pre-
sumption against finding that a federal statute preempted state coun-
terparts; rewrote the Smith Act provisions on “organizing;” and au-
thorized summary discharges of nonsensitive government personnel 
for security reasons.  Senate action focused on William Jenner’s pro-
posal to strip the Court of jurisdiction in all the areas where it had in-
 
 27 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 102 (2000). 
 28 Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (holding that the petitioner was entitled to 
an order instructing the Government to produce at trial all FBI reports relating to testi-
mony). 
 29 See Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) (holding that a teacher’s discharge for in-
competency, as a result of his refusal to answer questions relating to communistic affilia-
tions and activities, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (holding that firing a subway conductor 
when he refused to answer questions regarding Communist affiliations did not violate the 
Constitution). 
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terfered with the anti-communist programs.  There was too much 
opposition, and Senator John Marshall Butler offered an amendment 
to Jenner’s bill that would limit jurisdiction-stripping to admissions to 
the legal profession, but also undo an important holding limiting the 
House UnAmerican Activities Committee, rewrite the Smith Act on 
organizing, and change the preemption doctrine. 
Senate majority leader Lyndon Johnson tried to prevent any votes 
on anti-Court measures and was successful until the end of the ses-
sion neared.  Jenner-Butler was ultimately tabled by a 49-41 vote, but 
that was accompanied by a tremendous amount of anti-Court feeling.  
Immediately on the heels of that, a motion to table the House pro-
posals failed 39-45.  There was pandemonium in the Senate, but 
Johnson secured a recess until the next day and between his arm-
twisting and that of organized labor, enough votes were changed for 
the motion to recommit to pass 41-40.  Even though no anti-Court 
measure had passed, the Court had been slapped about harder than 
during FDR’s Court-packing fight.30 
Even the state chief justices piled on, adopting by a 36-8 vote a 
critical report on the Court that claimed “considerable doubt” that 
America was still a government of laws and not of men.31 
A clear message had been sent, and the Court, or at least a five-
man bloc of the Court, got it.32  Congressman Wint Smith had stated 
that “[t]he Court is simply blind to the reality of our times.”33  The 
second session of the Eighty-Fifth Congress gave it vision.  The rout 
had morphed the jurisprudence of 1961 into that of 1951 when the 
Court had sustained any repression the federal government author-
ized. 
Immediately after the Eighty-Fifth Congress had finished with its 
verbal bashing, the Court heard arguments in the Little Rock deseg-
regation case.  Massive resistance had come to Arkansas in 1957 when 
Governor Orval Faubus called out the National Guard to prevent 
nine Negro students from entering the previously all-white 2000 stu-
dent Central High School in Little Rock pursuant to a court-ordered 
plan.  When a federal judge ordered the Guard removed, their place 
was taken by a shrieking mob.  After three weeks of horrible interna-
tional publicity during which time the Secretary of State complained 
 
 30 POWE, supra note 27, at 131–34. 
 31 THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL-STATE 
RELATIONSHIPS AS AFFECTED BY JUDICIAL DECISIONS 35 (1958). 
 32 POWE, supra note 27, at 141–55 (describing the Court’s shift to ruling for government 
parties in cases involving communism). 
 33 104 CONG. REC. H2,011 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1958) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
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to Attorney General Herbert Brownell that Little Rock was ruining 
American foreign policy, Eisenhower sent in the 101st Airborne to 
enforce the court-ordered desegregation plan. 
Little Rock came to the Court in Cooper v. Aaron34 at a special 
summer session the next year over the issue of whether the “chaos, 
bedlam and turmoil” around Central justified postponing even the 
limited desegregation for a couple of years.35  The outcome was over-
determined.  If President Dwight Eisenhower, who Warren (wrongly) 
thought was opposed to Brown v. Board of Education,36 could protect 
court-ordered desegregation with troops, the Court could not rule 
that he acted in vain.  Furthermore to do otherwise would signal to 
every other Southern state that adopting a policy of violence at the 
first hint of desegregation was the road to legal salvation.  A battered 
Court (this being immediately after the second session of the Eighty-
Fifth Congress) ended the opinion with a bravado boast of its own 
potency.  In an unprecedented move, the opinion of the Court listed 
all nine justices as its authors and for the first time equated the Con-
stitution with its own pronouncements.  Thus it claimed that when a 
public official—like Faubus—took the oath to support the Constitu-
tion, the official was duty-bound to support the Court’s interpreta-
tions. 
This was an unprecedented claim of judicial authority.  Obviously 
parties are bound by the judgment of the Court, but in Cooper the 
Court held nonparties—if they had taken an oath to support the 
Constitution as all public officials do—were bound.  Nevertheless, 
this was the boasting of the weak.  In its wake the Court summarily af-
firmed the validity of Alabama’s Pupil Placement Law, a cornerstone 
of that state’s policy of massive resistance.  The justices adopted the 
reasoning of the court below, which opined that the court could not 
conclude “in advance of its application, that the Alabama Law will not 
be properly and constitutionally administered.”37  Actually they could, 
but Alabama would have ignored any court decision, and Eisenhower 
was not going to send the army in everywhere—indeed anywhere 
again—in the South.  Just as in the domestic security area, the Court 
was defeated (albeit temporarily). 
 
 34 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 35 Id. at 21. 
 36 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 37 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 358 U.S. 101 (1958), aff’g 162 F. Supp. 372, 
381–82 (N.D. Ala. 1958). 
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IV 
In 1958 the Court had been confronted by a Congress dominated 
by a coalition of Republicans and conservative (mostly Southern) 
Democrats.  In the mid-1960s, the Republicans shifted to support 
Northern Democrats and defeat Southern filibusters in order to pass 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  That 
the Court viewed this new coalition with equanimity was apparent in 
Katzenbach v. Morgan38 where it sustained section 4(e) of the Voting 
Rights Act that enfranchised any citizen who had completed the sixth 
grade in a Puerto Rican school where the instruction was in Spanish 
even if the person could not read or write English.  The problem for 
4(e) was that in 1959 a unanimous Court in Lassiter v. Northampton 
County Board of Elections39 held that the ability to read English was not 
an unreasonable requirement for voting. 
Katzenbach v. Morgan offered two rationales why 4(e) was constitu-
tional (the first being voting to cure a discrimination in the provision 
of municipal services).  The second was expansive as the Court stated 
“the result is no different if we confine our inquiry to the question 
whether section 4(e) was merely legislation aimed at the elimination 
of invidious discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.”40  But 
Lassiter held English literacy was not an invidious discrimination.  In 
the next paragraph the Court offered sentences stating the “Congress 
might well have”41 which viewed Congress as having an identical and 
independent ability to interpret the Constitution and supercede the 
Court’s contrary judgment. 
Cooper held all public officials were bound by the Court’s pro-
nouncements.  Katzenbach v. Morgan held that the Court’s decisions 
were subject to legislative reversal when the Congress was expanding 
rights.  The contrast could only be explained by the Court’s enthusi-
asm over Congressional concern for minorities and the confident be-
lief that liberalism was destined to dominate. 
Katzenbach v. Morgan was indeed aberrational and three years later 
in Powell v. McCormack42 the Court reverted to Cooper in rejecting a 
claim of legislative primacy in interpreting Article I, Section 5 allow-
ing Congress to judge the qualification of its own members.  The 
House had excluded Adam Clayton Powell from taking his seat for 
 
 38 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 39 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 40  Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653–54. 
 41  See id. at 654. 
 42 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
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wrongly diverting House funds and making false reports to the 
House.  The Court held that the Qualifications Clause limited the 
House to judging age, citizenship, and residence as expressed in Arti-
cle I, Section 2 and thus the House could add no other qualifications. 
The Court took a similar position of adhering to Cooper when con-
fronted with President Richard Nixon’s claim of executive privilege as 
ground for refusing to comply with a subpoena for tape recordings of 
White House meetings in the aftermath of the break-in of the De-
mocratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate com-
plex in 1972.  The Court claimed that the scope of executive privilege 
was subject to the judicial power to say what the law is and therefore 
could not be shared with another branch.43 
Less than three weeks later, Nixon resigned.  After swearing in 
President Gerald Ford, Burger expressed relief that “[the system] 
worked,” and Time magazine enthusiastically agreed.44  How myopic 
they were.  If there had been no taping system—or if Nixon had de-
stroyed the tapes (and it remains inexplicable that he did not)—then 
Watergate would have been a swearing contest between the President 
of the United States and his youthful former White House counsel 
John Dean, a man who looked every inch the snake that he was.  It 
would have been no contest; even long-time Nixon haters would not 
have sided with Dean. 
Nor did the Court play a great or heroic role.  The House Judici-
ary Committee acted without the benefit of the tapes at issue and the 
House was sure to follow.  What the Court did was revert to what it 
traditionally does—piling on to facilitate what is already happening.  
Nevertheless, the Court got a lot of good publicity and, in the Court-
centered world of lawyers, a lot of credit.  Thus, a decade later after 
Attorney General Edwin Meese targeted Cooper v. Aaron, a cascade of 
anathemas, pronounced by leaders of the bar, prominent academics, 
and columnists, rained down upon Meese.  Everyone claimed Meese’s 
position would undermine the rule of law.  When he publicly re-
canted less than three weeks later it helped seal the Court’s primacy 
over the Constitution (something easily demonstrated when the 
Court told President Bill Clinton that he could not delay until after 
his presidency a deposition in a pending civil suit45). 
 
 43 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
 44 Time for Healing, TIME, Aug. 19, 1974, at 9. 
 45 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
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V 
Equally as important as Planned Parenthood v. Casey’s46 refusal to 
overrule Roe v. Wade47 was what the opinion by Justices Sandra 
O’Connor, Anthony Kennedy, and David Souter said about the role 
of the Court in American society.  According to the troika, the Court 
could not overrule Roe because to do so would destroy the essential 
perceptions of the American people about the Court.  That would be 
too traumatic for everyone.  The troika claimed that occasionally, as 
in Roe, the Court “decides a case in such a way as to resolve . . . [an] 
intensely divisive controversy.”48  These cases have a “dimension” that 
a routine case does not, one that is “present whenever the Court’s in-
terpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a na-
tional controversy to end their national division by accepting a com-
mon mandate rooted in the Constitution.”49 
The troika’s opinion in Casey is the most pretentious in the United 
States Reports.  It asserted that the belief of Americans of themselves as 
a people who live according to the rule of law “[was] not readily sepa-
rable from their understanding of the Court . . . speak[ing] before all 
others for their constitutional ideals.”50  Before meant way above.  
Thus “[i]f the Court’s legitimacy should be undermined, then, so 
would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its consti-
tutional ideals.  The Court’s concern with legitimacy is not for the 
sake of the Court, but for the sake of the Nation . . . .”51  As if the 
American people (the vast majority of whom cannot name two sitting 
justices) spend their time thinking about the issue.  The troika spoke 
as if to say “we do it all for you, our people.”  And despite the con-
tempt of Antonin Scalia’s dissent, there was no disagreement among 
the Brethren with regard to the troika’s essential position on the role 
of the Court—“we’re number one.” 
The troika’s opinion did Cooper v. Aaron one better.  Under assault 
from the South, Cooper held that all public officials were bound by 
Brown.  Under assault from Republicans, the troika stated that all 
Americans must fall in step with the Court and cease fighting over 
Roe. 
 
 46 505 U.S. 833 (1992) 
 47 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 48 Casey, 505 U.S. at 866. 
 49 Id. at 867. 
 50 Id. at 868. 
 51 Id. 
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The full Court showed it was serious about its primacy when it 
struck down federal statutes designed to overrule two 5-4 decisions.  
One was the 1990 holding in Employment Division v. Smith52 that free 
exercise claims could be trumped by any law that does not specifically 
target religion.  The other was the Warren Court edict Miranda v. Ari-
zona53 with its notorious Miranda warnings. 
Almost immediately after Smith was decided, efforts began to re-
turn free exercise claims to their former status, and these bore fruit 
in 1993 with passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA).  Congress thoroughly vetted the constitutional issues involv-
ing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and was explicit in its 
intent to use Section 5 to return to the pre-Smith compelling state in-
terest standard.  With the support of both religious and civil liberties 
groups, RFRA passed the House unanimously and the Senate 97-3. 
In holding RFRA unconstitutional (as applied to states) Justice 
Kennedy tersely held that Section 5 gave Congress power to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and “[l]egislation which alters the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing 
the Clause.  Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is.”54  RFRA, by protecting religious conduct 
more generously than Smith did, was implementing a Congressional 
policy rather than enforcing the Constitution.  Hence RFRA was be-
yond Congressional authority. 
The Court said that because Congress was aware of the decision in 
Smith it had to know that “the Court will treat its precedents with the 
respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and 
contrary expectations must be disappointed.”55  The Constitution 
works best “when each part of the Government respects both the 
Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other 
branches.”56  In other words, Congress should know its place and rec-
ognize judicial supremacy, and the Court should keep Congress in its 
subordinate place. 
Meanwhile, Miranda had been unpopular with millions of Ameri-
cans from the instant it was decided in 1966.  Headlines proclaiming 
“Confessed Slayer of Wife and 5 Children Freed”57 will do that.  
Summer riots, an escalating crime wave, the quagmire in Vietnam, 
 
 52 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 53 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 54 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997). 
 55 Id. at 536 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 56 Id. at 535–36 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 57 FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 185 (1970). 
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and an impending presidential election led to the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,58 with a provision specifically 
contrary to Miranda.  If a judge found a confession was voluntary, 
based on the totality of the circumstances, then the statute pro-
claimed it was admissible against the defendant even if no warnings 
about constitutional rights had been given. 
After three decades of nonenforcement, a federal appeals court 
admitted a suppressed, voluntary, but unmirandized confession based 
on the 1968 law.  Justices Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Kennedy were 
on the record as opposing Miranda’s rule, but the three nevertheless 
refused to overrule.  Rehnquist’s opinion in Dickerson v. United States 
bluntly stated that “Congress may not legislatively supersede our deci-
sions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”59  Since Miranda 
applied a constitutional rule, Congress could not overrule it.  Rehn-
quist, O’Connor, and Kennedy did not like Miranda one bit, but they 
liked the thought of Congress gutting a Supreme Court decision far 
less.  Thus Miranda went from 5-4 at the height of the Warren Court 
to 7-2 (Justices Scalia and Thomas dissenting) at the Rehnquist 
Court.  If it was not for judicial imperialism, such a result simply 
could not be possible. 
VI 
Beginning in 2004, the imperial Court faced the imperial presi-
dency in time of war.  With the war on terror and Americans fighting 
in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the government claimed to need a lot.  
Indeed, President George W. Bush and his administration were mak-
ing claims of executive authority not seen since World War II (if 
then). 
After September 11, 2001, administration lawyers studying legal is-
sues that would be forthcoming agreed unanimously on only one is-
sue—those captured would be held outside the United States (and 
therefore hopefully outside the law of the United States).  Ultimately 
they decided captives were not to be criminal defendants where they 
would get a lawyer and a trial.  Nor were they to be prisoners of war 
where they would be entitled to the protections of the Geneva Con-
ventions (which the White House counsel Alberto Gonzales deemed 
 
 58 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968). 
 59 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000). 
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obsolete, quaint and inapplicable60).  Instead, they were enemy com-
batants to be held indefinitely for interrogation. 
A pair of major problems for Bush’s claims came from sequencing 
and timing.  The first round of cases involved American citizens 
treated as if they had no rights.  The next two rounds came after 
Bush was widely deemed to be incompetent. 
The initial pair of cases to arise asked (1) whether an American 
citizen, captured in Afghanistan, could be held as an enemy combat-
ant and denied an opportunity to prove his detention was wrongful, 
and (2) whether non-citizens detained abroad had the right to access 
American courts via habeas corpus to test the legality of their con-
finement.  The evening of arguments for the former, CBS News 
broke the story of abuses at Abu Ghraib, and while the opinions were 
being written the so-called “torture memo” of the Justice Department 
was released.61  It claimed the President had the inherent authority to 
override a Congressional ban on torture.  Neither helped the Bush 
administration. 
In Rasul v. Bush, the Court held that there was pre-existing statu-
tory jurisdiction to review the detention of non-citizens held at the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion also 
claimed that the allegations—that those seeking habeas had neither 
engaged in combat nor acts of terrorism against the United States 
and were held in detention without access to counsel or charges of 
wrong-doing—“unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”62 
If non-citizens had a right to access to a federal court, then, a for-
tiori, citizens, even those detained as enemy combatants (a category 
defined specifically to fit the facts of battlefield capture), had at least 
that right also, and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld said so.  With the exception of 
Thomas, the justices were unimpressed by the executive’s claim that 
separation of powers principles meant that courts should have no 
role in this aspect of the war on terror. 
No opinion garnered a majority of the justices.  Justice O’Connor 
for Rehnquist, Kennedy, and Breyer emphasized that the Congres-
sional authorization of the use of force authorized detention but 
 
 60 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales to George W. Bush, Decision Re Application of 
the Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with Al Qaeda and the Tali-
ban, (Jan. 25, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS:  THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 119–20 (Karen 
J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005). 
 61 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee to Alberto Gonzales (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE 
PAPERS supra note 60, at 172. 
 62 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3)). 
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might not authorize prolonged detention, which “carries the poten-
tial to become a means for oppression and abuse.”63  She also con-
cluded that due process required some ability to contest the facts 
supporting detention.  Thus there had to be a fair hearing before a 
neutral tribunal.  Souter, with Ginsburg, found that only a clear ex-
pression of Congressional intent could justify holding an American 
citizen without trial, and that the authorization of force was not such 
a declaration.  Scalia, with Stevens, went farther and concluded that, 
to hold an American, the government must either try him criminally 
or else obtain a statutory suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
Thomas’s lone dissent tracked the Bush Administration position—
the judiciary lacked the expertise to second-guess the executive.  So 
long as the executive was acting in good faith to defend the public, it 
had plenary authority to detain a citizen captured abroad. 
Immediately after the decision, the Defense Department created 
tribunals to review the status of all the detainees at Guantanamo, and 
the government released Hamdi to Saudi Arabia (after he renounced 
his American citizenship).  After holding him without charges for 
three years, the government stated he no longer posed a threat to the 
United States.  That pattern would replay itself again and again. 
Before the Court heard another war on terror case, two separate 
developments occurred.  First, there were leaks to the news media of 
heretofore secret and perhaps illegal programs.64  The second devel-
opment was passage of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which 
required adherence to the Geneva Conventions but also withdrew ju-
risdiction of federal courts to hear habeas petitions by Guantanamo 
detainees.65  In combination, these developments suggested an Ex-
ecutive Branch that believed it could fight the war on terror without 
Congressional help (or oversight) and a (Republican) Congress that 
believed the judiciary should keep out of it. 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld was a habeas challenge to the military tribu-
nals created to try detainees.66  Hamdan, arrested in November 2001, 
but not charged until after Hamdi, challenged both the definition of 
the substantive offense he was charged with—joining an enterprise 
dedicated to attacking civilians—as well as the structures and proce-
dures of the military commissions.  The Court, over dissents by Tho-
 
 63 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004). 
 64 See generally JAMES RISEN, STATE OF WAR:  THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA AND THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2006) (describing the Bush administration’s domestic spying program 
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 65 Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). 
 66 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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mas, Scalia, and Alito (Roberts being disqualified because he had 
participated in the opinion below anticipating the position of the dis-
senters), first concluded that the DTA did not apply to Hamdan’s 
case.  The majority then held that Congress had not authorized the 
tribunals, and, indeed, they were contrary to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice and the Geneva Conventions.  In an extraordinary 
declaration, the Court stated “the Executive is bound to comply with 
the Rule of Law that prevails in this jurisdiction,” thereby making 
clear that the Executive was not acting in accordance with the “Rule 
of Law.”67 
Breyer’s concurring opinion twice stated that the President could 
go to Congress to seek whatever authority he deemed necessary.  
With his hand forced by Hamdan, that is exactly what Bush did, and 
the supine Republican Congress, abetted by electorally-frightened 
Democrats, responded in barely over three weeks with the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA)68 giving Bush everything he 
wanted—including the ability to use evidence obtained by torture 
prior to December 20, 2005, as well as a specific provision eliminating 
judicial review except by a single appeal of a verdict by a military 
commission (limited to issues of law and not fact).  Breyer had stated 
that the Court’s “conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground:  
Congress had not issued the Executive a ‘blank check.’”69  With the 
MCA, the Congress deposited that check in the Executive’s account.  
Some members of Congress knew they had checked their principles 
at the door.  Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter, for instance, 
acknowledged that the MCA was unconstitutional and voted aye any-
way. 
Whether the MCA is consistent with the Constitution is a con-
tested question.  If Bush had asked for the MCA in 2003, Congress 
would have readily handed it to him and its chances of approval 
would have been far greater prior to the 2006 elections.  Now, how-
ever, there are two ways to view Hamdan.  One is based on separation 
of powers, a demand that Congress be brought into the process of 
deciding how to treat detainees.  The other is a “Rule of Law” de-
mand that procedures be consistent with the Due Process Clause.  Af-
ter the Court successfully cut Congress in, Congress tried to cut the 
Court out with the MCA.  Not surprisingly there were challenges to 
the MCA even before there were trials before the commissions. 
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Events undermined the military commission system beginning 
with the repudiation of the Republicans in the 2006 elections.  In the 
eighteen months after the Democratic victories, more and more in-
formation about the administration policies on detainees became 
public.  The first challenge to the MCA was denied review over three 
dissents.  Then, almost three months later, after an officer involved 
with the commissions called the supposed trials a farce, the Court 
agreed to hear the case, meaning at least two justices who had previ-
ously voted not to review (Kennedy and Stevens), switched. 
Subsequent news reports disclosed that the highest administration 
officials had met in the White House to discuss which detainees to 
torture and what coercive means should be used.  A general in the 
Pentagon was found by a military judge to have asserted unlawful 
command influence by engaging in “nanomanagement of the [Guan-
tanamo] prosecutors’ office.”70  The former chief prosecutor testified 
that Pentagon officials had pressured him to bring well-known de-
tainees to trial before the 2008 election because otherwise “this 
thing’s going to implode.”71  The Pentagon supervisor demanded that 
evidence acquired by torture be used even though prosecutors have 
an ethical obligation to present evidence only if they consider it reli-
able.  And it appeared that torture may have been widespread.  
Prosecutors were also told there could be no acquittals (because oth-
erwise how could the years of detention be justified?).  All in all, the 
executive branch had deemed the Rule of Law outmoded in a post-
9/11 world. 
With Roberts able to participate, the likely vote was 5-4, and given 
Kennedy’s switch plus his connections with European jurists, he was 
highly likely to vote with the liberals.  In June, 2008, Kennedy, in-
deed, authored the 5-4 rebuke to both the administration and the 
formerly Republican Congress by holding that the denial of habeas in 
the MCA was unconstitutional and that detainees had a right to a ha-
beas hearing in a federal court.72  Combat Review Status Tribunals 
were deemed an inadequate substitute for habeas (where a judge can 
order a prisoner released).  This was the ultimate defeat of the ad-
ministration’s legal theory for holding detainees off-shore—because 
the Court ruled that detainees did have rights under the Constitution 
and federal courts could enforce them. 
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Roberts’s dissent (joined by the other three conservatives) as-
serted that the decision was premature and accused the majority of 
judicial triumphalism.  The majority felt, however, that after six years 
of confinement and with the prospect of lifetime incarceration in 
case of possible mistaken imprisonment, that action now was neces-
sary.  (When Hamdan complained that he won at the Court and yet 
received nothing for his victory, the prosecutor rejoined that he had 
his name and victory in the law books.) Scalia’s dissent claimed that 
the Court’s decision would cost American lives.  (One hopes his ready 
“I told you so” proves as wrong as Harry Blackmun’s similar assertion 
in his Pentagon Papers dissent.73) 
Republicans and Democrats split completely over the decision.  
Soon-to-be Republican standard bearer, John McCain, proclaimed 
the decision among the worst in American history.  His Democratic 
counterpart, Barack Obama, hailed it as a step “toward reestablishing 
our credibility as a nation committed to the rule of law.”74  Yet, as pre-
viously, the Court left important questions unanswered.  What is the 
substantive standard justifying continued detention?  Does the deci-
sion affect those the government intends to try by military commis-
sion as well as whether the procedures before the commissions com-
port with due process? 
Berkeley Professor John Yoo, author of the infamous “torture 
memo” as head of the Office of Legal Counsel, has lamented that the 
Court has not accorded Bush the deference an earlier Court granted 
FDR.75  There are at least four reasons for this, the latter two being 
the more important.  First, and not flippantly, Bush is no FDR.  Bush 
made spectacular claims of authority matched with the spectacular 
incompetence of his administration.  Second, Bush had but two ap-
pointees (and two other reliable votes).  Third, after decades of try-
ing to put the executive into balance the Court was unlikely to reverse 
course and offer the President the constitutional blank check he 
wanted.  Fourth, since Casey the Court has trumpeted judicial imperi-
alism.  As with bringing the executive back to the Constitution, it 
seems unlikely to reverse its course. 
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